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PLATO AND THE DANGEROUS PLEASURES OF POIKILIA*
ABSTRACT
A significant strand of the ethical psychology, aesthetics and politics of Plato’s Republic
revolves around the concept of poikilia, ‘fascinating variety’. Plato uses the concept to
caution against harmful appetitive pleasures purveyed by democracy and such artistic or
cultural practices as mimetic poetry. His aim, this article shows, is to contest a prominent
conceptual connection between poikilia and beauty (kallos, to kalon). Exploiting tensions
in the archaic and classical Greek concept, Plato associates poikilia with dangerous
pleasures to redirect admiration toward a distinctly philosophical pursuit of the nature of
beauty. This is to displace a prominent and problematic cultural sensibility—the aesthetics
of poikilia—not to deny that fascinating variety, even in mimetic poetry, may be beautiful.
Rather, Plato’s cultural critique lays bare an epistemological problem in the ethical psych-
ology of beauty: since they cannot be distinguished from what seems beautiful, how should
one respond to fascinating yet dangerous attractions?
Keywords: Plato; pleasure; beauty; poikilia; kalon; ethical psychology; ancient Greek
aesthetics; lovers of sights and sounds
Central to the ethical psychology, aesthetics and politics of Plato’s Republic is the
concept of poikilia. Denoting the fascinating experience of various colours, sounds or
textures, as well as of intellectual cunning, the concept of poikilia embodies a tension
in archaic and classical Greek thought that beauty (to kalon, kallos), though central to
living well, can captivate the senses and mind in disastrous ways.1 It is against this
cultural background that Plato uses the concept to caution against attractive but
harmful pleasures purveyed by democracy (Resp. 557c5, 558c1–2, 559d7–8, 561e3–8),
musical and other cultural practices (398d7–399e12, 404d1–e6) and mimetic poetry
(604e1–605a6). Because the concept connects ethically deficient psychological, political
and artistic structures, Plato might seem to judge poikilia unequivocally harmful and not
beautiful.2 However, the concept occupies a more complicated role in the dialogue, one
with significant implications for Plato’s ethical psychology and aesthetics.
* I would like to extend sincere thanks to Wolfgang Mann, Lydia Goehr, Pauline LeVen, Nickolas
Pappas, Elizabeth Scharffenberger and an anonymous referee for CQ for their valuable comments on
earlier drafts of this paper, and to Laura Martin for reminders of its contemporary importance.
1 Though it is uncontroversial to treat kallos as analogous to the concept of beauty, it remains stand-
ard to construe to kalon as primarily the fine, admirable or noble and only derivatively the beautiful
for lexical reasons discussed by P. Woodruff, Plato Hippias Major (Oxford, 1982) and D. Konstan,
Beauty: The Fortunes of an Ancient Greek Idea (New York, 2014). Yet beauty is, like the kalon, an
aesthetic and an ethical concept. More specifically, Plato’s treatment of poikilia is unintelligible with-
out emphasis on the aesthetic dimensions of the kalon in ethical motivation and evaluation.
2 A widespread view: J. Moss, ‘What is imitative poetry and why is it bad?’, in G.R.F. Ferrari (ed.),
The Cambridge Companion to Plato’s Republic (Cambridge, 2007), 415–44, at 426, 435–7;
Z. Petraki, The Poetics of Philosophical Language: Plato, Poets and Presocratics in the Republic
(Berlin, 2011), 64–5, 181–5, 235–50; R.S. Liebert, ‘Apian imagery and the critique of poetic sweet-
ness in Plato’s Republic’, TAPhA 140 (2010), 97–115 and ead., Tragic Pleasure from Homer to Plato
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A re-examination is necessary because the dialogue grants positive heuristic value to
poikilia that presupposes its beauty. The most beautiful (κάλλιστα) and precise of
visible phenomena, the astronomical bodies and their observable motions—poikilmata
and poikilia in Socrates’ phrase (529b1, 529d8)—can and should be studied as models
of intelligible astronomical patterns. Indeed, by admiring their complexity, one may
come to understand the cosmos as the most beautiful work of a divine, benevolent intel-
lect (529d8–530a7; κάλλιστα: 529c9–d1, 529e3, 530a6–7).3 The question becomes not
just how this use of poikilia coheres with its abuse throughout the dialogue but, more
fundamentally, what Plato is doing with and to this concept in the Republic. In particu-
lar, how does poikilia relate to beauty?
This article shows that Plato contests a prominent cultural sensibility—the aesthetics
of poikilia—which presumes a conceptual connection between poikilia and beauty.
Plato exploits tensions in the former concept to sever this connection, because, in his
view, this connection promotes an indiscriminate pursuit of pleasure and precludes a
distinctly ‘philosophical’ engagement with beauty. Yet, far from denying that poikilia
may be beautiful, his treatment lays bare a problem in the pursuit of beauty: one
must learn to negotiate fascinating yet dangerous attractions, for such attractions cannot
be distinguished from the experience of beauty.
At stake in this interpretation is not simply a richer understanding of the substance and
detail of a significant if neglected argument of the dialogue. It has broader historical and
philosophical ramifications. Because the concept of poikilia marks a privileged mode of
sense-perception, its genealogy holds for scholars of ancient aesthetics potential insight
into how certain ancient Greeks perceived their world. Our current historical narrative,
however, takes Plato’s criticisms to show that archaic delight in variety gave way to a
radically different classical sensibility. To re-examine those criticisms is to re-examine
this narrative. Philosophically, by appreciating that Plato grants that poikilia may be
beautiful, we may cast fresh light onto the decisive role he accords beauty in learning
to live well.
My argument proceeds in three stages. Section I outlines the historical sensibility
that presumes a conceptual connection between poikilia and beauty. The following
two sections reconstruct how and why Plato contests this sensibility. I show in section
II how the attempt to dissociate poikilia from beauty underlies the seemingly disparate
charges of immoderate pleasure in the soul, politics and arts, while section III examines
(Cambridge, 2017), 134–55; also B. Rosenstock, ‘Athena’s cloak: Plato’s critique of the democratic
city in the Republic’, Political Theory 22 (1994), 363–90; S. Halliwell, The Aesthetics of Mimesis:
Ancient Texts and Modern Problems (Princeton, 2002), 93–4, 325; R.W. Wallace, ‘Plato, poikilia,
and New Music in Athens’, in E. Berardi, F. Lisi and D. Micalella (edd.), Poikilia. Variazioni sul
tema (Acireale, 2009), 201–13; J.I. Porter, The Origins of Aesthetic Thought in Ancient Greece:
Matter, Sensation, and Experience (Cambridge, 2010), 86–7; A. Grand-Clément, ‘Poikilia’, in
P. Destrée and P. Murray (edd.), A Companion to Ancient Aesthetics (Malden, MA and Oxford,
2015), 406–21, at 415–16, though recognizing the need for reappraisal at ead., La fabrique des cou-
leurs: histoire du paysage sensible des Grecs anciens (Paris, 2011), 488 n. 436.
3 Cf. Ti. 39d2–40a9, Phd. 110b5–d7, on which see A. Nightingale, ‘The aesthetics of vision in
Plato’s Phaedo and Timaeus’, in A. Kampakoglou and A. Novokhatko (edd.), Gaze, Vision, and
Visuality in Ancient Greek Literature (Berlin, 2018), 331–53. Leg. 665c2–6, Menex. 234c4–235c4,
Phdr. 277b5–c6 attest the pedagogical value of poikilos speech and song, on which see M. Tulli,
‘Una Spaltung: Platone, la poikilia e il sapere’, in E. Berardi, F. Lisi and D. Micalella (edd.),
Poikilia: variazioni sul tema (Acireale, 2009), 227–38. Prior to questions of development across
dialogues is the question of how Socrates can, and why he does, admit the beauty of poikilia within
the dialogue that criticizes it most severely.
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the metaphysical and epistemological dimensions of this critique, an attempt to redirect
admiration toward the non-sensible nature of beauty. Both stages reveal a profound
ambivalence toward poikilia, whether in Socrates’ attraction to mimetic poetry or in
wonder at the starry heavens, to suggest that Plato recognizes the risk that attractions
to beauty may subvert a good life.
I. THE AESTHETICS OF POIKILIA
It is necessary first to review the conceptual history of poikilia. For it is seldom
remarked, particularly in the philosophical literature, that Plato is concerned with histor-
ically specific, descriptively thick and affectively charged meanings of poikilia rather
than with such thin notions as variety or multiplicity simpliciter. It will suffice to
focus on patterns of conceptual use that Plato appropriates or subverts, most pressingly
the tendency in archaic and classical discourse to presuppose that poikilia is necessary or
sufficient for beauty. This tendency regulates an aesthetic and ethical sensibility that I
shall call the aesthetics of poikilia.
In archaic poetry, the adjective poikilos praises primarily the fascinating effect of
juxtaposing various colours, patterns, fabrics, sounds or other elements. The verb poikillō
refers to the skilful activity of a craftsperson that produces this effect. The adjective
also praises the mental agility of animals, heroes or divinities endowed with cunning
intelligence (mētis).4 While the prominence of these terms suggests that archaic poets
and audiences relish ‘the variegated nature of the objects of their senses’,5 the concept
refers not merely to a property of an object but essentially to a fascinated experience of a
perceiver.
This experience is often explicitly marked as the experience of beauty. Recall
Anchises wondering at Aphrodite clad as a maiden in a pampoikilos robe:
Now when Anchises saw her, he marked well and wondered (θαύμαινεν) at her appearance and
height and shining garments. For she was wearing a dress more radiant than the brightness of
fire, beautiful, golden, pampoikilon (καλὸν … παμποίκιλον), so that it shone like the moon
over her tender breasts, a wonder to behold (θαῦμα ἰδέσθαι).6
Connected to the seductive radiance and lush texture of beauty, what is (pam)poikilos
bespeaks divinity; rightly suspecting her a god, Anchises fears the maiden but is over-
come by erotic desire (Hymn. Hom. Ven. 5.93–106, 185–91). Similarly, when Hecuba
wishes to entreat Athena, she selects from among her pampoikila robes ‘one that was
most beautiful in its embroidering, largest, and shone like a star’ (ὃς κάλλιστος ἔην
ποικίλμασιν ἠδὲ μέγιστος, | ἀστὴρ δ᾽ ὣς ἀπέλαμπεν, Il. 6.294–5). Reflecting the
privileged status of poikilia in archaic gift exchange, these robes, all beautiful, are
treasured: gifts for the queen, kept in a vault, befitting the divine.7
The essential point, however, is this: whether of persons or artefacts, the fascinating
experience of poikilia is fundamentally ambivalent even—or especially—when praised
as the experience of beauty. Odysseus’ description of his marvellous brooch provides an
4 Grand-Clément (n. 2 [2011]), 418–88 provides a comprehensive lexical survey.
5 So B.H. Fowler, ‘The archaic aesthetic’, AJPh 105 (1984), 119–49, at 119.
6 Hymn. Hom. Ven. 5.84–90. Translations throughout are my own, based on the text of standard
editions.
7 Gift exchange: e.g. Od. 15.104–8, 125–7, 205–7; 18.292–6 (collocated with περικαλλέα);
Sappho, fr. 44.8–10 Voigt.
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exemplary case in point, which reveals several aspects of the concept from which this
ambivalence derives (Od. 19.227–31):
The front part was artfully wrought (δαίδαλον): a hound held a dappled (ποικίλον) fawn in his
forepaws, preying on it as it struggled; and all marvelled (θαυμάζεσκον) how, though they were
golden (ὡς οἱ χρύσεοι ἐόντες), the hound preyed on the fawn and strangled it, and the fawn
struggled with its feet as it tried to escape.
The Homeric poet locates wonder and, by implication, beauty in fascinating optic
effects, marked by poikilos and its semantic cousin, daidalos, which emphasizes
elaborate craftsmanship. The former refers first to the dappled aspect of the golden
fawn, a common application of the term to an animal’s spotted, iridescent or complexly
patterned exterior. But it refers also to the apparent motion of the fawn and the hound.8
Together these referents structure perception around the sensuous surface of the brooch.
So it is that viewers perceive the animals in the elaborated, shimmering gold, marvelling
at how inanimate metal seems to come alive.9
And yet the scene is a violent struggle of life and death, a metonym for the danger of
poikilia. The hound captures the fawn like the brooch captivates its viewers, and
Odysseus his audience. These comparisons are encouraged by the nested frames through
which the poet assimilates the imagination of Odysseus’ audience to the gazes of the awe-
struck viewers and to the paralyzed fawn meeting the ferocious gaze (as one could render
λάω) of the hound.10 The fawn fears the hound; the poikilia of the brooch inspires fear, as
an element of wonder (thauma); auditors, we shall see, are and should be suspicious of
Odysseus. For although poikilos refers above to a fawn, it almost exclusively describes
dangerous animals, particularly snakes, whose multicoloured, iridescent or complexly pat-
terned skin camouflages, seduces prey or stuns predators.11 That is, their beauty is focally
related to the exercise of cunning intelligence (mētis), an ability, linked to virtue (aretē)
and wisdom or skill (sophia), to adapt to circumstances and outwit others through deceit
and disguise.12 In this connection, too, what is poikilos designates a beautiful and thus
admirable, kalon, character. Hence Aesop’s fable of the fox and the leopard (Aesop 12
Perry):
The fox and the leopard were disputing their beauty (περὶ κάλλους ἤριζον). The leopard
displayed each of the spots adorning his skin (τὴν τοῦ σώματος ποικιλίαν προβαλλομένης),
but the fox, interrupting him, said, ‘And how much more beautiful (καλλίων) than you am I,
adorned not in body but soul’ (τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν πεποίκιλμαι).
It is assumed that poikilia is sufficient, if not necessary, for beauty. The fox shows his
beautiful wiles in manipulating the terms of the contest so that he comes out victorious.13
The worry is that such beauty also manipulates minds.
8 Horse: Pind. Pyth. 2.8; leopard: Aesop 12 Perry; snake: Pind. Pyth. 4.249, 10.46, 8.46; Alcm. fr.
1.66 PMGF; Thgn. 1.602; bird: Pind. Pyth. 4.214–16; Alcm. fr. 345.2.
9 Cf. R. Neer, The Emergence of the Classical Style in Greek Sculpture (Chicago, 2010), 59, 67, 113.
10 For the alternate rendering, see Porter (n. 2), 447, following R. Prier, Thauma Idesthai: The
Phenomenology of Sight and Appearance in Archaic Greek (Gainesville, FL, 1989), 32.
11 This is the sole use, to my knowledge, of poikilos for prey. It seems less an outlier than an
inversion of typical associations of animal poikilia with predatory or defensive tactics.
12 See M. Detienne and J.-P. Vernant (transl. J. Lloyd), Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and
Society (Chicago, 1991), 18–44.
13 Thus it will fall to Socrates to show that an unjust person, secretly like Archilochus’ crafty fox
(ποικίλην, Resp. 365c5–6), should not be admired and emulated, despite his reputation for justice.
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It is significant in this connection that Aphrodite lends Hera specifically a poikilos
ribbon to seduce Zeus in the famous scene of deception at Il. 14.214–21:
Aphrodite spoke and from her breasts unbound the elaborate, pattern-pierced ribbon (κεστὸν
ἱμάντα | ποικίλον), with all enchantments (οἱ θελκτήρια) inlayed, with erotic appeal and desire
there… ‘Take this ribbon and hide it away in the fold of your bosom. It is elaborate (ποικίλον),
all things inlayed. And I think whatever is your heart’s desire shall not go unaccomplished.’
Or we might consider how, at the climax of Aeschylus’ Agamemnon, Clytemnestra
entices the king to enter the palace via the richly embroidered purple tapestries on
which, fit for the gods, Agamemnon hesitates to tread in case he should provoke divine
envy: ‘Being mortal, it is not for me or anyone to step on poikilois beauties
(ἐν ποικίλοις … κάλλεσιν) without fear (ἄνευ φόβου)’ (923–4). Clytemnestra arguably
persuades him by exploiting his desire for envy among human beings, directing his
attention to the wealth and power that the beautiful tapestries display. However opaque
his psychology, though, the crucial significance of poikilia as a fascinating yet danger-
ous attraction is clear: Agamemnon repeats the term three times (923, 926, 936) as he is
led inside to be bound and murdered, not only metaphorically but now literally ensnared
by Clytemnestra’s woven plot.14
The ekphrasis of Odysseus’ brooch obeys the same structure: a poikilos mind cun-
ningly uses a poikilos artefact. None other than Odysseus, often called poikilomētis
for his wiles,15 describes the brooch in an artful speech that foregrounds issues of truth-
telling and deception. Disguised as a beggar, Odysseus attempts to convince Penelope
that he (the beggar) entertained Odysseus. Only moments earlier are we reminded that
Odysseus makes many falsehoods seem true (Od. 19.203). This is high praise in the
agonistic context of archaic poetry—how better to display skill at persuasion than by
convincing someone of something false?—yet still such cleverness garners criticism.16
Penelope is suspicious; she tests the beggar by asking what Odysseus was wearing. The
ekphrasis convinces her. Plato, we shall see, will buttress the suggestion that audiences
guard against the power of poikilia by a psychological, political and metaphysical
picture of a good human life.
The ground was well prepared. Ambivalence in archaic sources intensifies as the
term poikilos becomes more pejorative with the rise of democracy at classical Athens.
It comes to signify, on the one hand, the opposite of frank speech and transparency
and, on the other hand, a barbarian or effeminate character. These latter connotations
are due to the fact that members of the aristocracy appropriated from Persia and Eastern
Greece a luxurious lifestyle, characterized by expensive clothing, perfumes and golden
jewellery, to display their superiority once nouveaux riches began to compete in wealth.
Through what Leslie Kurke has called the ‘politics of habrosynē’, aristocrats relied on
Tellingly, this first use of poikilos in the Republic comes in Adeimantus’ challenge to Socrates to
defend justice for its own sake against the poetic tradition.
14 M. Mueller, Objects as Actors: Props and the Poetics of Performance in Greek Tragedy
(Chicago, 2016), 55–6 shows that poikilia here relates the beauty and status of the tapestries to
Clytemnestra’s clever verbal tactics. For poikilia as feminized erotic charm, cf. Pind. Pyth. 4.212–
16; Eur. Med. 1159; Sappho, fr. 1.1–2 Voigt.
15 Il. 11.482; Od. 3.163, 13.293; Eur. IA 526.
16 See further N. Worman, The Cast of Character: Style in Greek Literature (Austin, 2002), 108–92.
Pindar similarly praises his odes as poikiloi (Ol. 3.8–9, 4.2–3, 6.87; Pyth. 9.77; Nem. 4.14, 5.41–2), yet
could caution against the ‘intricate’ but false tales of other poets (δεδαιδαλμένοι ψεύδεσι ποικίλοις …
μῦθοι, Ol. 1.29).
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the beauty and social capital of poikilia to reclaim ethical and political status.17 Those
sympathetic to the democracy could then invoke the term to stigmatize political enemies
at home and, after the Persian War, abroad. By another turn, anti-democratic critics of
the so-called New Music, to which we shall return, invoke poikilia as a metaphor for
socio-political disorder.
These lexical changes have been taken to show that the concept of poikilia no longer
tracks the fascinated experience of variegated materials, much less perceptions of
beauty.18 Yet, rather than infer that the aesthetics of poikilia becomes defunct at clas-
sical Athens, in which case Plato could have no cause to dislodge this sensibility, it
is more judicious to infer that the concept becomes more contested in the following
two ways: (1) it becomes disputable whether what is poikilos is beautiful or otherwise
praiseworthy; and (2) the concept comes to function as a label with which to claim
artistic or socio-political status for oneself or to deny such claims of others.19 Such
contestation is intelligible, though, only against a conceptual background in which
poikilia remains tied to beauty, virtue and wisdom.
II. CULTURAL CRITIQUE
We may now examine how and why Plato exploits these conceptual tensions to displace
the aesthetics of poikilia. I shall examine how in some detail but might anticipate
broadly why: its spurious conception of beauty promotes an indiscriminate pursuit of
pleasure and precludes a corrective ‘philosophical’ pursuit of beauty. This criticism
depends on an assumption that one becomes like what one admires as beautiful
(kalon). The assumption strikes a structural correspondence between what one admires
and one’s psychological constitution.20 Before examining its metaphysical reaches in
the next section, I shall reconstruct how this assumption animates an attempt throughout
the Republic to dissociate poikilia conceptually from beauty by assimilating the former
to harmful, indeed shameful and ugly, pleasures.
II.1 Tastes of democracy and aristocracy
The cultural critique is most concentrated at Republic Book 8. There Socrates diagnoses
the appeal of democracy in terms of the aesthetics of poikilia (Resp. 557c4–9):
17 L. Kurke, ‘The politics of ἁβροσύνη in archaic Greece’, ClAnt 11 (1992), 91–120.
Grand-Clément (n. 2 [2011]), 328–38, 480–8 traces the broader lexical changes.
18 So Grand-Clément (n. 2 [2015]), 416; P. LeVen, ‘The colours of sound: poikilia and its aesthetic
contexts’, GRMS 1 (2013), 229–42, at 241. While these and related lexical changes may reflect
changes in thought and sensibility, Neer (n. 9) shows that the concept of poikilia continues to regulate
production and reception of classical sculpture and, in his Style and Politics in Athenian Vase-Painting
(Cambridge, 2002), Attic red-figure.
19 Cf. e.g. PMG 708.5–10: Pratinas’ satyr-chorus elevates their ‘swanlike song of variegated wing’
(οἷά τε κύκνον ἄγοντα ποικιλόπτερον μέλος) above ‘the spotted toad breath’ (τὸν φρυνέου ποικίλου
πνοάν) of the aulos. This denies and at the same time appropriates the claim of aulos-players to artistic
superiority, made under the banner of poikilia.
20 A specific case of ‘like encouraging like’ (Resp. 425c1–2), this assumption lies behind the
scheme of acculturation through beauty at Resp. Books 2–3 (401b1–402a6). Cf. 500c7–9 for its meta-
physical expression, with section III below.
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κινδυνεύει, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καλλίστη αὕτη τῶν πολιτειῶν εἶναι. ὥσπερ ἱμάτιον ποικίλον πᾶσιν
ἄνθεσι πεποικιλμένον, οὕτω καὶ αὕτη πᾶσιν ἤθεσιν πεποικιλμένη καλλίστη ἂν φαίνοιτο.
καὶ ἴσως μέν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καὶ ταύτην, ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδές τε καὶ αἱ γυναῖκες τὰ ποικίλα
θεώμενοι, καλλίστην ἂν πολλοὶ κρίνειαν.
‘Possibly,’ I said, ‘this is the most beautiful of the constitutions. Like an elaborate cloak embroi-
dered in all colours, this city, embroidered with all kinds of character, would appear most beau-
tiful. And perhaps,’ I said, ‘many people would judge it most beautiful, as women and children
do when they see multicoloured things.’
Notice, first, that Socrates’ collocations of ‘most beautiful’ with cognates of poikilia
could have little sense were the conceptual connection between poikilia and the kalon
no longer prominent. His remarks are constructed to undermine this connection.
Socrates first hazards that democracy is (εἶναι) the most beautiful regime, because it
permits one to live howsoever one pleases (Resp. 557b8–10). He then qualifies that
democracy would appear (ἂν φαίνοιτο) most beautiful, which by this stage of the dia-
logue introduces quite some doubt, echoed by the shift from the indicative to the opta-
tive mood. Finally, Socrates weakens the claim still further, shifting the grammatical
subject to the many who would judge democracy most beautiful (ταύτην …
καλλίστην ἂν πολλοὶ κρίνειαν).21 Comparing the many, and many an archaic and clas-
sical male, to a woman or a child suggests that they mistake fascinating variety of col-
ours (patterns, pursuits and the like) for the nature of beauty.
It is, indeed, the nature of beauty at issue. The passage neither states nor implies that
the diversity of democracy is not beautiful. It is often taken to do so, sometimes on the
basis of a mistaken assumption that the term poikilos is entirely pejorative or itself con-
notes ‘merely superficial beauty’.22 This force may be a consequence but cannot be the
precedent of passages such as this. Notice that Socrates must labour to reveal an analo-
gous mistake of the many concerning mimetic poetry. Seduced by its musical colours
(τῆς μουσικῆς χρωμάτων)—verse sung in naturally charming metres, rhythms and
tunings (φύσει … κήλησιν)—they believe mimetic poets are experts in their subject
matter (Resp. 601a5–b2).23 These charms, like the appeal of democracy, are relatively
superficial, Socrates implies in a doubly erotic image: were its musical colours stripped
off like clothing (γυμνωθέντα, 601b2–3), mimetic poetry would look unattractive,
akin to faces of once beautiful boys now bereft of the bloom of their youth (τὸ
ἄνθος, 601b7–9). As we shall see, the fact that these charms cannot be extracted
from mimetic poetry, particularly for someone under its fascinating spell, reflects a
conceptual difficulty of disentangling beauty altogether from poikilia.
For the moment, however, our textual parallel shows that democracy seems beautiful
to someone who looks uncritically, like the child who judges a tyrant beautiful from the
outside without looking into his character (Resp. 577a3–7).24 Yet, while the child is
21 Cf. N. Villacèque, ‘De la bigarrure en politique (Platon, République, VIII, 557c4 sqq)’, JHS 130
(2010), 137–52, at 143.
22 So Rosenstock (n. 2), 377; emphasis added. Compare Moss (n. 2), 426; Petraki (n. 2), 15 n. 28,
242–3; Grand-Clément (n. 2 [2015]), 415–16. S. Monoson, Plato’s Democratic Entanglements:
Athenian Politics and the Practice of Philosophy (Princeton, 2000), 170–1 captures the evaluative
nuance.
23 This charm is soon characterized by poikilia (Resp. 604e–605a, on which see below), but
skiagraphia is implicitly linked to poikilia by 365c3–6: like a crafty (poikilos) fox, the unjust person
disguises injustice by a ‘façade of virtue’, σκιαγραφίαν ἀρετῆς.
24 So too the tyrant’s ‘tragic vestige may be seen stripped off’ in private (γυμνὸς ἂν ὀφθείη τῆς
τραγικῆς σκευῆς, Resp. 577b1). His bodyguard is, like himself, ‘beautiful and numerous and various
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mistaken, the same cannot obviously be said of those who judge democracy and, to
anticipate, mimetic poetry beautiful.25 The above passage implies only that it is incorrect
to believe that being poikilos is identical to, necessary or sufficient for being beautiful. If
the ‘colours’ (ἄνθεσι) of democracy are like the bloom of youth (τὸ ἄνθος) to which
poetic poikilia is compared—as the wordplay suggests—then they should be beautiful,
if fleetingly so. What matters is that the text leaves indeterminate the aesthetic status and
the potential value of poikilia, a score on which we shall continue to find some ambiva-
lence. Plato is unambivalent, however, about the need to displace its prominence as a
criterion of beauty.
What is the harm? The tacit argument is that this misconception causes one to pursue
pleasure indiscriminately and thus become, psychologically, as disunified as the objects
one admires. To bring this argument into view, we might begin by noticing that the
comparison of democracy to a multicoloured cloak does not simply convey the diversity
of a theoretical model of democracy but diagnoses the aesthetics of poikilia as an
animating principle of Athenian democracy. The simile refers to and attempts to neutral-
ize two symbols, the Panathenaic peplos and the Stoa Poikilē, with which democratic
Athens glorified its identity, ideals and hegemony. Both symbols seem to have
employed an artistic principle of poikilia to valorize poikilia as a principle of political
composition. Socrates strikes a similarly deep accord between an emphasis in aesthetic
judgement on sensory pleasure and the same emphasis in political life. In his estimation,
democracy celebrates anarchy and license as freedom and equality, revaluing moder-
ation and shame as illiberal because they inhibit the indiscriminate pursuit of pleasure
(Resp. 557e1–558b9, 560d4–561c5). To conclude that democracy seems ‘a pleasurable
constitution, anarchic and variegated’ (ἡδεῖα πολιτεία καὶ ἄναρχος καὶ ποικίλη,
558c2–3) is to propose that democracy is regulated by the connection first struck in
archaic poetry between beauty and the sensory pleasures of poikilia and to undermine
this connection by rendering such pleasures shameful.
This strategy turns against democracy the very rhetoric by which democrats dero-
gated poikilia as an aristocratic appetite for sensual things. The strategy is necessary
because, as Robert Seager, Josiah Ober and others remind us, democrats redefined exist-
ing political and ethical concepts, leading in many cases to ‘the democratic pillaging of
aristocratic values’.26 Pressed to find a vocabulary to criticize democracy, Socrates uses
its own anti-aristocratic valence to unmask its self-image.
Socrates elaborates the psycho-ethical harm of the aesthetics of poikilia through his
analysis of the individual who typifies democracy, ‘a multifarious man, full of all sorts
of characters, beautiful and various’ (καὶ παντοδαπόν τε καὶ πλείστων ἠθῶν μεστόν,
καὶ τὸν καλόν τε καὶ ποικίλον, Resp. 561e3–4). The collocation of poikilon and
(poikilon) and never the same as itself’ (568d6–7). Note here, too, the thick socio-political associ-
ations of poikilia: the guard consists of foreign mercenaries (567e1).
25 The fascinating quality of poikilia has not been taken to complicate Socrates’ attitude toward
mimetic poetry, though it has been taken to complicate his attitude toward democracy. For
Monoson (n. 22), Socrates admires democracy in so far as it provides philosophy a home and models
of human psychology (at 166–9, 223–6). Her case, however, seems strained to compare
παραδείγματα at Resp. 557d8 with 529d8–9. More promising is the observation of R. Blondell,
The Play of Character in Plato’s Dialogues (Cambridge, 2002), 67, 111, 142–61 that Socrates is char-
acterized by a democratic ideal of versatility.
26 So R. Seager in his ‘Review of N. Loraux, L’invention d’Athenes: histoire de l’oraison funèbre
dans la “cité classique” (Paris, 1981)’, JHS 102 (1982), 267–8, at 268. J. Ober, The Athenian
Revolution: Essays on Ancient Greek Democracy and Political Theory (Princeton, 1996), 155 applies
the point to the present passage.
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kalon again evokes and calls into question their prominent conceptual connection.
Precisely this connection underlies the envy and admiration of the many for this character,
who sometimes (τοτέ) drinks heavily while delighting in the aulos, sometimes diets;
sometimes exercises, sometimes not; sometimes busies himself with what seems to him
philosophy; but who often (πολλάκις) leaps up in the assembly to speak and act as he pleases
(561c7–d5). This is the glorious image of cunningOdysseusmade political.27 To those reared
on this ethical ideal, the motivational structure of the democratic individual seems beautiful,
despite its lack of order and force of necessity. The criticism of democracy therefore extends
to the underlying sensibility that supports and is supported by the regime.
The scope of the criticism must be emphasized to appreciate also that the image of
the democratic individual criticizes the aristocracy for its delight in poikilia. Not only
does the simile of the multicoloured cloak require the anti-aristocratic valence that
democrats lend the term poikilos. Socrates’ quip that if the democratic individual
‘happens to admire soldiers, he’s carried that way, if money-makers, that way’ (κἄν
ποτέ τινας πολεμικοὺς ζηλώσῃ, ταύτῃ φέρεται, ἢ χρηματιστικούς, ἐπὶ τοῦτ᾽ αὖ,
Resp. 561d5–7) seems deliberately to parody the aristocratic ideal of a poikilon ēthos
attested in the elegies attributed to Theognis (Thgn. 213–18 ≈ 1071–4):28
θυμέ, φίλους κατὰ πάντας ἐπίστρεφε ποικίλον ἦθος,
ὀργὴν συμμίσγων ἥντιν᾽ ἕκαστος ἔχει.
πουλύπου ὀργὴν ἴσχε πολυπλόκου, ὃς ποτὶ πέτρῃ
τῇ προσομιλήσῃ τοῖος ἰδεῖν ἐφάνη·
νῦν μὲν τῇδ᾽ ἐφέπου, τότε δ᾽ ἀλλοῖος χρόα γίνου.
κρέσσων τοι σοφίη γίνεται ἀτροπίης.
My heart, to all your friends keep turning your variable character,
Mixing your temperament to the like of each.
Create the temperament of a tangled cuttlefish, which always makes itself look
like whatever rock it has just clung to.
Now be like this; then, at another time, be like someone else in your colouring.
Surely skill is better than inflexibility.
The advice is to cultivate an élite sociability, to mingle well with companions.
Aristocrats would praise this variable character at symposia, that is, while attempting
to consolidate power through ties of nobility in opposition to emerging democratic
ideals. And they would perform this character, mingling sociably as they adopt fluid
personalities by performing poetry as different personae, donning masks in the form
of ‘eye-cups’ and, of course, getting drunk.29
Socrates contains the aristocratic ideal of the poikilon ēthos in his criticism of the
democratic individual—just as, please observe, the democratic individual contains
first a symposiast drinking to the aulos—to yoke these factions together at the level
of aesthetic-cum-ethical sensibility. Both democracy and aristocracy are structured by
a conception of beauty as poikilia. This is a surprising and revisionary diagnosis, but
it reinforces an earlier conceptual move. At Republic Book 3, Socrates and Glaucon
27 Cf. Thuc. 2.41.1 with B.M.W. Knox, The Heroic Temper: Studies in Sophoclean Tragedy
(Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1964), 121–2: ‘the democratic viewpoint … is Odyssean – an ideal of
versatility, adaptability, diplomatic skill, and intellectual curiosity’.
28 To my knowledge, this allusion has not yet been observed.
29 On political functions of poikilia on sympotic vases, see Neer (n. 9). ‘Theognis’ as persona of
disaffected aristocrat: L. Kurke, ‘Archaic Greek poetry’, in H.A. Shapiro (ed.), The Cambridge
Companion to Archaic Greece (Cambridge, 2007), 141–68, at 144–9.
PLATO AND THE DANGEROUS PLEASURES OF POIKILIA 9
Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0009838821000318
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Hawaii at Manoa Library, on 03 May 2021 at 06:12:15, subject to the Cambridge
remove poikilia from the material culture of Kallipolis on the grounds that poikilia in
music causes licentiousness, in cuisine disease (ἐκεῖ μὲν ἀκολασίαν ἡ ποικιλία
ἐνέτικτεν, ἐνταῦθα δὲ νόσον, Resp. 404e3–4). The μὲν … δέ clause requires a fairly
general sense of poikilia, perhaps captured by ‘complexity’—one sufficiently flexible to
connote the immoderate pursuit of appetitive pleasure in both musical and culinary prac-
tices. Yet it would be a mistake to infer that Socrates is thinning out the concept to fit his
philosophical purposes. For he means to indict specific democratic and aristocratic prac-
tices for purveying a corrupt conception of beauty.
Democracy is indicted in the charge that, like panharmonic tunings played on
multi-stringed instruments (Resp. 399c7–8), complex and various rhythmic feet
(ποικίλους … παντοδαπὰς βάσεις, 399e10–11) make one graceless, unable to perceive
and cultivate the graceful beauty of a virtuous person.30 For poikilia is the staple of New
Musicians, whose musical innovations—including increased instrumental range, mixed
tunings and prioritizing the modulations of the aulos rather than fitting tuning and
rhythm to verse (cf. 398d8, 400d4–5)—came to signify democratic revolution and inclu-
sivity. While Socrates may have philosophical reasons to reject the view that music is
beautiful to the extent that it excites psychosomatic upheaval, for rhetorical purposes
he taps into the anxieties of his élite male interlocutors over the ecstatic power of the
aulos to compromise their rational rule over themselves and others.31 His concern is
that, because musical structures influence and are influenced by psychological and
political structures (424c6–d4), to valorize musical poikilia is to reinforce a poor orien-
tation to value in ethical and political life.
Less acknowledged than the democratic affiliation of musical poikilia is the aristocratic
conception of beauty at stake in culinary poikilia. When Socrates recommends a simple
diet without, in particular, a Sicilian variety of relishes (Σικελικὴν ποικιλίαν ὄψου, Resp.
404d2), he is removing luxuries introduced by Glaucon’s objection that one cannot live
well in a city of bare necessity because one is ‘without relishes’ (ἄνευ ὄψου, 372c2).
Glaucon’s objection is not initially motivated by appetitive desires for pleasure, nor
does he now set aside fancier tastes for the good of moderation or health. Rather, the
exchange turns on the value of beauty, the kalon. Glaucon demands relishes owing to
a spirited ambition to preserve his sense of a cultured and beautiful life, one worthy of
admiration.32 He wants to dine in the aristocratic manner to which he is accustomed
(ἅπερ νομίζεται, 372d4–e1). Into Kallipolis, therefore, come the delicacies, furniture
30 Cf. Resp. 400d9–402a4, especially the primacy of beauty in tuning and rhythm (401d3–e1),
discussed carefully by A.-E. Peponi, Frontiers of Pleasure: Models of Aesthetic Response in
Archaic and Classical Greek Thought (Oxford, 2012), 144–53.
31 See further E. Csapo, ‘The politics of the New Music’, in P. Murray and P. Wilson (edd.), Music
and the Muses: The Culture of Mousikē in the Classical Athenian City (Oxford, 2004), 207–48 with
the observation of P. Leven, The Many-Headed Muse: Tradition and Innovation in Late Classical
Greek Lyric Poetry (Cambridge, 2014), 101–3 that musicians politicized their music through the
vocabulary of poikilia. Aulos as locus of anxieties: e.g. P. Wilson, ‘The aulos in Athens’, in
S. Goldhill and R. Osborne (edd.), Performance Culture and Athenian Democracy (Cambridge,
1999), 58–95; R. Martin, ‘The pipes are brawling: conceptualizing musical performance in
Athens’, in C. Dougherty and L. Kurke (edd.), The Cultures within Ancient Greek Culture:
Contact, Conflict, Collaboration (Cambridge, 2003), 153–80.
32 Here I am indebted to M.F. Burnyeat, ‘Culture and society in Plato’s Republic’, The Tanner
Lectures on Human Values 20 (1999), 215–324, at 230–6. P.W. Ludwig, ‘Eros in the Republic’, in
G.R.F. Ferrari (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Plato’s Republic (Cambridge, 2007), 202–31
attends to spirit in this connection (at 225–6), though he takes the passage as evidence that spirited
motivation should be eliminated.
JONATHAN FINE10
Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0009838821000318
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Hawaii at Manoa Library, on 03 May 2021 at 06:12:15, subject to the Cambridge
and accoutrements of the symposium, notably such conventional kala as painting, poikilia
(presumably, embroidery), gold and ivory (373a1–9).33 How can Glaucon reject these
attachments only moments later? It is at least in part because Socrates has in the mean-
while revalued poikilia as emasculate luxuries opposed to the masculine ideal of courage
to which Glaucon is also attracted: ‘real men’ do not eat fish, much less Sicilian delicacies
(404b5–c6). To regulate the culture by a standard of simplicity (ἡ ἁπλότης, 404e4), then,
is to displace a live standard of beauty at classical Athens by revaluing concrete forms of
‘complexity’ as ugly and shameful pleasures, not as emblems of an admirable life.
II.2 Mimetic poetry reconsidered
The criticism of poikilia in mimetic poetry at Republic Book 10 follows the same
course. Because its historical context and its rhetorical subtext have not been appre-
ciated, however, scholars have mistaken pejorative connotations of poikilia for a denial
of its beauty. The concept, I argue, expresses Socrates’ simultaneous repulsion and
attraction toward mimetic poetry, tracing a far more ambivalent response than has
traditionally been allowed. This ambivalence reflects a philosophical problem. One
must negotiate how to respond to such fascinating yet dangerous attractions because
these cannot be neatly separated from the experience of beauty.
The relevant charge is that by presenting ‘the irascible and poikilos character’ (τὸ
ἀγανακτητικόν τε καὶ ποικίλον ἦθος, Resp. 605a5–6), which admits of much
poikilēn mimēsis (πολλὴν μίμησιν καὶ ποικίλην ἔχει, 604e1), mimetic poets reinforce
false values that undermine the rule of reason in the soul. The term ‘irascible’
(ἀγανακτητικόν) refers to the non-rational element that relishes in grieving the loss
of someone dear (603e3–4) and impedes the ability of reason to measure suffering in
light of a wider scheme of value (604c1–2). This element rules tragic heroes and the
many to whom they seem beautiful (φαίνεται καλὸν εἶναι τοῖς πολλοῖς, 602b3),
unsurprisingly, since virtuous conduct is alien to this motley crew (πανηγύρει καὶ
παντοδαποῖς ἀνθρώποις, 604e5), reared as they have been to find poikilia paradigmatically
beautiful.34 More opaque is what it means that this character admits of πολλὴν μίμησιν
καὶ ποικίλην. Perhaps it is that the dramatic presentation of this character is intricate or
that it takes various forms because emotional turmoil can be expressed in various
ways.35 Clearly, the phrase evokes connotations of sensory pleasure, psychological
instability and deception that have accrued to the concept of poikilia, all of which caution
against mimetic poetry. What, more specifically, do the terms of poikilia at Resp.
604e–605a imply?
33 Reading καὶ τὴν ποικιλίαν (373a8) with most manuscripts; cf. 401a2. It may refer not only to
embroidery if counted among πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα. For the aristocratic basis, cf. the lists of conventional
kala at Hip. mai. 289d8–290b8, 298a1–5.
34 I take φαίνεται καλόν to underscore how value shows up to someone on account of her accul-
turation, reflecting the concern that mimetic poetry reinforces false values of the sort that Resp. Books
2–3 argues it instils. Here I cannot agree with Moss (n. 2), 424, for whom the force is ontological:
‘value does not appear’. V. Harte, ‘Republic 10 and the role of the audience in art’, OSAPh 38
(2010), 69–96 notes how the audience contributes to the identification of mimetic poetry.
35 English translations reflect uncertainty whether poikilos is a quality of mimēsis (Grube, rev.
Reeve: ‘many multicolored imitations’), a quantity (Jowett: ‘a great variety of materials for imitation’;
Shorey: ‘many and varied occasions for imitation’) or both (Griffith: ‘highly susceptible to all sorts of
varied imitation’). ‘Very intricate [complicated, etc.]’ is possible, if unlikely, taking καί intensively
rather than copulatively.
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The tripartite division of the soul provides some clarification. For poikilia has
become a term of art for appetitive desires, a ‘diverse and many-headed beast’
(θηρίου ποικίλου καὶ πολυκεφάλου, Resp. 588c7–8), and the sort of unnecessary ‘vari-
ous and complicated pleasures’ (παντοδαπὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ ποικίλας, 559d7–8) to which
they are directed. To speak of ‘the irascible and poikilos character’ is to suggest, by
referring jointly to the appetites and a debased form of spirit, the psychological diagno-
sis of the democratic individual who shamelessly pursues the immediate gratification of
all pleasures.36 This psychological disintegration flows from a false evaluative and
metaphysical picture, also suggested by the concept of poikilia, which, according to
Socrates, motivates the excessive grief of tragic heroes. This is the picture sometimes
proffered in tragedy that human life is beset by irreconcilable conflicts of value or by
inexplicable suffering in an opaque cosmic order. However accurately this picture
may register what Nietzsche called, echoing Resp. 602a–b and 604e–605a, the ‘multi-
coloured and diverse’ (‘bunt und mannichfaltig’) texture of our lives, Socrates exhorts
one to believe that the order of being is knowable by reason and structured toward
human happiness.37 Sympathy for tragic heroes perseveres a false worldview and pre-
cludes the philosophical commitments that might correct it.
Alongside these general resonances, however, we should remember that poikilon
ēthos refers in the context of tragedy less to a character ‘stormy, passionate, emotional,
full of inner conflict’ than to the rather more specific cunning character of an Odysseus,
Prometheus or Medea.38 This specific reference matters. It throws suspicion toward
intellectual cunning at classical Athens onto actual models of democratic citizenship
and the tragic poetry that glorifies those models. Such suspicion gains force from the
connotation of poikilēn mimēsis of clever, tricky, or cunning craftsmanship, developing
earlier comparisons of poets and painters to magicians who can create manifold appear-
ances (γοητείας … ἡ θαυματοποιία, Resp. 602d5; cf. 598d4–5). These resonances form
exactly the pattern of thought we found with Aphrodite, Clytemnestra and Odysseus: a
poikilos mind (poet) uses a poikilos artefact (poetry) to manipulate senses and minds.
Socrates unmasks this power by arguing that mimetic poets neither have nor need
knowledge to gratify our silliest cognitive capacities. But his debt to this traditional pat-
tern suggests more at work. After all, it leads to the remarkable claim that the mimetic
poet does possess wisdom (ἡ σοφία αὐτοῦ, 605a3), misdirected though it is toward
pleasing the crowd.
This concession of wisdom suggests that the concept of poikilia expresses a measure
of admiration. While scholars standardly take Socrates to mean that mimetic poetry
merely seems beautiful, en route to ‘banishing’ it without equivocation from the ideal
constitution, we should take pause from the fact that the overall argument is far more
provisional, reflecting what Stephen Halliwell has observed is an unresolved problem
for Plato of reconciling a love of philosophy with a love of poetry.39 Socrates concedes
36 Cf. Resp. 411b3–c3, with P. Destrée, ‘Poetry, thumos, and pity in the Republic’, in P. Destrée
and F.-G. Herrmann (edd.), Plato and the Poets (Leiden, 2011), 267–81.
37 F. Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music, §14 in K. Ansell Pearson and
D. Large (edd.), The Nietzsche Reader (Malden, MA and Oxford, [1872] 2006), 67. Compare
Halliwell (n. 2), 98–117, whose discussion of ‘the tragic worldview’ seems more appropriate to the
present passage than an emphasis on the ‘heterogeneity’ of imagination (at 94); cf. Liebert (n. 2
[2017]), 145–6.
38 So Moss (n. 2), 435.
39 S. Halliwell, Between Ecstasy and Truth: Interpretations of Greek Poetics from Homer to
Longinus (Oxford, 2011), 179–207.
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at the start that he would rather not detail the harm of poetry out of fondness and
reverence for Homer, but ‘one must tell’ the truth, twice using an impersonal imperative
ῥητέον that separates the subsequent criticism from his personal attachment (Resp.
595b11, c5). Lest the sentiment, like the concession of wisdom at Resp. 605a3, seem
ironic, the same emotional complex returns as the argument concludes. Socrates and
Glaucon would gladly welcome mimetic poetry into a good political or psychological
constitution because they are intimately aware of how enchanted they are by her
(ἅσμενοι ἂν καταδεχοίμεθα, ὡς σύνισμέν γε ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς κηλουμένοις ὑπ᾽ αὐτῆς,
607c7–8), if only her benefit could be shown, whether in metre or by her lovers in
prose (607d4–e2).40 Yet, even without this defence, Socrates’ erotic passion (ἔρως,
607e5, 608a1) motivates him not to abandon mimetic poetry. He and Glaucon contrive,
like lovers who must force themselves apart from a harmful beloved, to counteract their
enchantment by singing a distillation of their argument as an ‘incantation’ while they
will listen to poetry (ἀκροασόμεθ᾽ αὐτῆς ἐπᾴδοντες ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς, 608a4–5), presupposing
that they will continue to listen.41 This contrivance and, especially, the erotic imagery,
connected like κήλησις at 601b1 to beauty, reflect persistent but conflicted attraction.
But perhaps by now this is unsurprising: poikilia always connoted danger amid admir-
ation; Socrates has simply inverted the archaic proportions. The concept uniquely traces
the contours of this ambivalent aesthetic response.
If this proposal is promising, it is terribly misleading to take poikilos at Resp. 604e–
605a to connote what merely seems beautiful. This is false to Socrates’ phenomenology.
If it is not incoherent to say that what one loves merely seems but is not beautiful, it is
disingenuous to say that it merely seems beautiful, as though it were insignificant, yet
exerts so powerful a hold that one must remain on guard. This is not to deny that
Socrates relates poikilia to a metaphysically, epistemically and ethically deficient notion
of sensory appearance. Nor is to deny that Socrates encourages us to infer that what is
poikilos is complex and seems beautiful, whereas what is beautiful is simple, for
example by characterizing what makes music, virtue and gods beautiful ultimately in
terms of the ontological nature of the form of beauty.42 But it is to suggest that this infer-
ence belongs to a rhetorical strategy that aligns poikilia with what seems (but may not
be) beautiful for protreptic reasons, to undermine its analytic connection to beauty.
Unless we recognize this strategy, we shall fail to appreciate the philosophical problem
that Socrates’ ambivalence illustrates. The problem is that one cannot neatly distinguish
the fascinating yet harmful attraction marked by the concept of poikilia from the experience
of beauty.
An initial difficulty is to identify the offending items. Suppose poikilia were opposed
to beauty as ‘complex’ to ‘simple’. If, however, its meaning and value are historically
specific and constantly contested, as I have emphasized, then what it means to be ‘com-
plex’ cannot be understood in purely descriptive or ontological terms, as though one
could distinguish the right kind of music by counting the notes. It is precisely because
there is no neutral evaluative ground on which to make his criticism, much less convince
a partisan of the aesthetics of poikilia, that Socrates must strategically exploit the
tensions internal to the concept.
40 Mimetic poetry is personified as a hetaira, on which see Peponi (n. 30), 131–5.
41 Cf. Phd. 77e3–9 for a partially parallel incantation against fear of death.
42 This contrast is best developed by Moss (n. 2), 427, 436.
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In so far as one such tension links poikilia with deception, a distinction might seem
available, after all, along the lines of the contrast between seeming and being. Yet how is
this contrast to be drawn? The case at hand is rather knottier than the one Socrates sug-
gests for comparison. A straight stick in water ‘merely seems’ bent, because we ration-
ally judge it to be straight (Resp. 602c11–d3). However, fascination in poikilia, like
most encounters with beauty, is too absorbing for better judgement to hold sway, too
awesomely compelling not to seem beautiful while in its grips. This is a psychological
consideration, to be sure. But the underlying difficulty is conceptual. One cannot distin-
guish poikilia from beauty because both are constitutively modes of attractive appear-
ance. Like his contemporaries, Plato typically conceives of beauty not in the early
modern terms of an objective property or a subjective feeling but in the phenomeno-
logical terms of how something elicits in a human being a cluster of attitudes including
erotic desire, psychosomatic pleasure, wonder and fascination. Such, however, is also
the phenomenology of poikilia.43 If it is a conceptual truth that to be beautiful is in
part to appear beautiful, then the contrast of appearance and reality, seeming and
being, will be insufficient to demarcate what is beautiful from what is not.44
Of course, what seems beautiful may not be so. And it is significant in this regard
that, whereas one can ask whether what seems beautiful really is so, there is no mean-
ingful question whether what seems poikilos really is so. The metaphysical contrast does
here gain traction. But the lesson, I would suggest, is that the apparent beauty of poikilia
is, first, an appearance to the senses and, second, all there is to being poikilos. The struc-
ture of this appearance is not the presentation or disclosure of something else, as sensible
beauty is for Plato (properly understood as) the disclosure of non-sensible being, the
form of beauty. The lesson, or consequence, is not that this apparent beauty is illusory.
Indeed, Socrates cannot quite claim that it is so. If beauty is the intentional object of
erotic desire, which Socrates has for mimetic poetry, he should at some level find
mimetic poetry beautiful. This may be at the level of non-rational psychology. But
that should only reinforce the complexity of Socrates’ attitude.
In arguing that, despite his cultural critique, Socrates keeps greater company with
contemporary aesthetic attitudes than tends to be acknowledged, I mean to suggest
that Plato preserves the tension within the concept of beauty remarked at the outset.
On the one hand, if mimetic poetry is a dangerous pleasure, it becomes dissociated
from beauty, as beauty relates closely to the good. Yet, on the other hand, the psycho-
logical—and conceptual—pressure to consider the object of this fascinating, indeed
erotic, experience beautiful entails that the pursuit of beauty contains the possibility
of peril.45 Beyond the difficulty of reconciling competing loves of philosophy and of
poetry, Plato places under the sign of poikilia a more general problem in the ethical
psychology of beauty: how should one respond to fascinating yet dangerous attractions?
43 Cf. Menex. 234c5–235b2: funeral orators praise the war-dead ‘so beautifully (οὕτως καλῶς) that
they enchant (γοητεύουσιν) our souls, embellishing somehow in most beautiful words (κάλλιστά πως
τοῖς ὀνόμασι ποικίλλοντες) praise each man deserves and praise he does not’; so ‘charmed’
(κηλούμενος) is Socrates that for the three days he feels ‘greater, nobler and more beautiful’. It
does not disturb the conceptual point that Socrates may be mocking orators, audiences and himself.
44 Phdr. 250d3–e1 suggests the ontological basis of this point: Beauty is most self-disclosive
(ἐκφανέστατον, 250d7). See the penetrating remarks of A. Kosman, ‘Beauty and the good: situating
the kalon’, CPh 105 (2010), 341–57.
45 I discuss this point, and how beauty for Plato comes apart from the good, in the context of erotic
desire in ‘The guise of the beautiful: Symposium 204d ff.’, Phronesis 65 (2019), 129–52.
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III. SIGHTS AND SOUNDS, VISION AND WONDER
This general problem subtends the discussion of cosmic poikilia from which we began.
There, however, the problem takes shape from a metaphysical contrast between what is
sensible as opposed to what is intelligible. The astronomical motions of heavenly bodies
may point toward the intelligible, but risk absorbing one’s attention further into the
sensible world. This metaphysical contrast underwrites why for Plato poikilia cannot
be analytic to beauty: because it is sensory, what is poikilos can be beautiful but not
what it is to be beautiful. Before we return to the discussion of astronomy, it will
help to observe how this particular target comes in the crosshairs of the argument at
Resp. 475d–480a that lovers of sights and sounds lack knowledge because the many
beauties to which they are directed admit of being not-beautiful.46 Though understand-
ably mined for its epistemological detail, the argument is framed by aesthetic and ethical
considerations which have passed unremarked.47 This passage, I propose, works to
displace the aesthetics of poikilia by subordinating a rather similar sensibility to a
philosophical engagement with beauty.
The lovers of sights and sounds are characterized in two ways, before and after the
argument. Each reflects a background concern with poikilia. The latter characterization
focusses on ethical psychology. Because they do not attend to what remains always the
same, lovers of sights and sounds ‘wander’ (πλανώμενοι) among sensible phenomena
that vary every which way (Resp. 484b6–7). This is a consequence of the general prin-
ciple that one’s psychology becomes structured like what one admires. By ‘wandering’
Socrates means not only that their cognitive condition, belief (δόξα), is unstable because
it is structured toward changeable items but also that their characters are unstable; they
themselves wander. This is presumably because their norms or standards (νόμιμα), not
merely their opinions, of beauty ‘wander’ (πλανητόν, 479d8) or ‘roll around’
(κυλινδεῖται) between knowledge and ignorance (479d3–4).48 The implication, which
returns us to the matter of poikilia, is that, if one’s ethical norms become so unmoored,
one becomes vulnerable to thinking, like the democratic individual or the tyrant, that
nothing is any more beautiful than ugly, good than bad or just than unjust (538d7–
e3). That is, if one attends toward what is sensible, not least its variety and multiplicity,
rather than toward an ontological item as unitary and stable as the Beautiful Itself, then
one is prone to that shameless pursuit of pleasure later characterized in terms of poikilia.
46 The controlling premise is that, whereas the Beautiful Itself is completely or purely (τὸ παντελῶς
ὄν, Resp. 477a3; τοῦ εἰλικρινῶς ὄντος: 477a6, 478d4–5, 479d5), sensible beauty is beautiful relative
to some time, place, person, respect or comparison class; cf. Symp. 211a1–b5. The temporal condition
is here forefront. The crucial move in the question-and-answer exchange is whether the many beautiful
‘things’ (objects or properties) will seem somehow ugly (φανήσεται, 479a8). Future tense is needed,
because a lover is less likely to grant that a beloved now seems ugly than that beauty will fade. This is
particularly so in the context of paiderasteia, which prefaces the argument: Socrates notes that lovers
manage to admire any putative facial flaw of their beloveds (474d2–475a3).
47 The few scholars who connect the argument to the poikilia motif do so by relating the
ontological deficiency of the sensible world to the multiplicity of poikilia: Petraki (n. 2); Liebert
(n. 2 [2017]), 136 n. 45; Moss (n. 2), 426–8, 437, citing (at n. 35) Ti. 50d5: becoming as such is
ποικίλου πάσας ποικιλίας. It is true that poikilia connotes multiplicity and that lovers of sights
and sounds are comparable to, if not members of, audiences of mimetic poetry (cf. Resp. 601a5–
b2, 604e1–605a6). However, the concept does not appear in this passage and never refers in the
Republic to precisely the ontological deficiency of the sensible world. Thanks to an anonymous
reviewer for encouraging me to clarify this point.
48 Cf. Resp. 484d1 τὰ νόμιμα καλῶν τε πέρι καὶ δικαίων καὶ ἀγαθῶν, ‘norms about beautiful
[noble, admirable], just and good things’.
PLATO AND THE DANGEROUS PLEASURES OF POIKILIA 15
Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0009838821000318
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Hawaii at Manoa Library, on 03 May 2021 at 06:12:15, subject to the Cambridge
This is not to say that one of the lovers of sights and sounds’ norms of beauty is
poikilia. The text does not enter such detail. But the way in which these lovers are
first characterized brings the aesthetics of poikilia more fully to the fore. Glaucon, we
will recall, objects that, if a philosophos were simply a lover of all kinds of learning,
then ‘many strange people’ (ἄτοποι) would be philosophers: lovers of sights (οἱ
φιλοθεάμονες) seem to enjoy learning, as do lovers of sounds (οἱ φιλήκοοι), though
the latter folks would rather attend every Dionysian festival than a serious discussion
or some such study (λόγους καὶ τοιαύτην διατριβήν, Resp. 475d1–9). Glaucon suggests
that common forms of intellectual culture, usually denoted by ‘lover of sounds’,49
including spectating and perhaps criticizing theatre, are just so much noise compared
to philosophical discourse.
The theatrical context recalls the historical fact and foreshadows Socrates’ criticism
of poikilia as a cultural standard of both beautiful poetry and ethical character. So should
the sensibility of the lovers of sights and sounds. They are positively attracted to beauty
in so far as it ‘appears to be many … manifesting itself everywhere’ (πανταχοῦ
φανταζόμενα πολλὰ φαίνεσθαι, Resp. 476a6–7). Like those enraptured by the won-
drous movement of Odysseus’ golden brooch, they are attracted to beauty at the level
of material composition: they ‘embrace beautiful sounds, colours, shapes and everything
fashioned out of them’ (τάς τε καλὰς φωνὰς ἀσπάζονται καὶ χρόας καὶ σχήματα καὶ
πάντα τὰ ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων δημιουργούμενα, 476b4–6). The proliferation of beauty in
these phrases suggests that lovers of sights and sounds are not merely focussed on sens-
ible beauty as opposed to some Platonic ‘form’ of beauty, as is most everybody. They
are rather more stringently unwilling to grant that the variety of sensible beauty could be
united or explained by a single principle (οὐδαμῇ ἀνεχόμενος ἄν τις ἓν τὸ καλὸν φῇ
εἶναι, 479a5–6). This orientation to beauty is remarkably congruous to the aesthetics of
poikilia.
Plato must demarcate these figures from philosophers, and in so doing articulate the
metaphysical limitation of the aesthetics of poikilia, because philosophy is characterized
by a competing love of beauty. Seldom is the similarity duly emphasized, perhaps
because readers assume that Plato opposes aesthetic and philosophical engagement as
Glaucon does.50 Yet Plato has Socrates immediately remind Glaucon that these ‘strange’
lovers of sights and sounds are like philosophers (ἀλλ᾽ ὁμοίους μὲν φιλοσόφοις, Resp.
475e2–3), just as he will have to remind Glaucon that the ‘strange’ (ἀτόπους) prisoners
of the allegory of the cave are ‘like us’ (ὁμοίους ἡμῖν, 515a4–5). The similarity is two-
fold. Like philosophers, lovers of sights and sounds are committed to and enjoy learn-
ing, and they attempt to learn through an erotic pursuit of beauty. But the philosopher,
who loves the spectacle of truth or being (τοὺς τῆς ἀληθείας … φιλοθεάμονας, 475e4–5),
pursues what lovers of sights and sounds deny, namely all manifestations of beauty
49 See LSJ s.v. φιλήκοος; cf. Resp. 535d5, 548e5.
50 An impression furthered by labelling the lovers of sights and sounds derogatorily ‘aesthetes’;
e.g. D. Sedley, ‘Philosophy, the forms, and the art of ruling’, in G.R.F. Ferrari (ed.), The
Cambridge Companion to Plato’s Republic (Cambridge, 2007), 256–83, at 257–9. The obverse
assumption, also common, is that the (sensible) kalon is here ‘purely aesthetic’ and non-ethical.
Yet the kalon comes along with the just and the good, as elsewhere, and interest in learning at
Athenian theatre extends beyond artistic technique to ethical and political matters, contra
R. Gosling, ‘Republic Book V: τὰ πολλὰ καλά, etc.’, Phronesis 5 (1960), 116–28, at 121–2. For sen-
sitive attention to these points, see C. Meinwald, ‘Who are the philotheamones and what are they
thinking? Ta polla kala in Republic V’, AncPhil 37 (2017), 39–57. At Ap. 22c3, πολλὰ καὶ καλά
describes insights into human life and the divine; at Symp. 209e2, virtuous deeds.
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and pre-eminently the Beautiful Itself (476b6–c4).51 This creates a difference in ethical
epistemology. The philosopher does not presume that one learns how to live well by
attending plays to acquire, through sensation and cultural authority, putative exemplars
of beauty or virtue as opposed to pursuing a systematic body of knowledge of their
nature. And this creates, in turn, an aesthetic difference. The philosopher engages
with beauty as grasped perceptually and intellectually, seeking in the many beauties a
unifying principle by which to comprehend the variety in which lovers of sights and
sounds revel, that they may discern sensible beauties as participants in the Beautiful
Itself. The point to emphasize is that, if the philosopher shares some of the aesthetic
habit as characterizes the aesthetics of poikilia, Plato must undermine this sensibility to
make viable the pursuit of philosophy. Indeed, so far as ethical and epistemic progress
relies on the vision of beauty, Plato competes on shared terrain.
This is terrain staked out by the study of astronomy discussed at Republic
Book 7. Socrates extends the above argument but brings the ambivalent role of poikilia
and its beauty centre stage. The heuristic value of admiring the heaven, we will recall, is
qualified by Socrates’ joke that to count contemporary astronomy among ‘higher’
studies, as Glaucon suggests, is to think one can learn something ‘by looking with
his head thrown back at decorations (poikilmata) on the ceiling’ (ἐν ὀροφῇ
ποικίλματα θεώμενος, Resp. 529a10–b2). The term poikilmata captures the sensible
nature and relative superficiality of observable astronomical motions, ‘adorned’, as it
were, ‘on the visible surface’ of the heaven (ἐν ὁρατῷ πεποίκιλται, 529c8–9), as
well as of their varying speeds, positions and orbits. These motions are thus not the
‘true’ astronomical motions, knowledge of which requires geometry. Yet this does
not prevent the sort of mathematical astronomer whom Socrates advocates, for example
Timaeus in the eponymous dialogue, from admiring how the ‘wanderings’ of the planets
are ‘wondrously elaborate’ (τὰς τούτων πλάνας … πεποικιλμένας δὲ θαυμαστῶς, Ti.
39d1–2) or, indeed, from reserving highest praise for those brightest, most beautiful,
fixed stars that embellish (πεποικιλμένον) the sky as a veritable adornment (κόσμος)
of the cosmos (Ti. 40a3–9).
Our initial puzzle was how Plato can have Socrates similarly praise the poikilia of the
cosmos as beautiful while seeming to disparage poikilia as a harmful and rather not
beautiful pleasure. The solution, we have seen, is that Plato grants that poikilia may
be beautiful and its experience beneficial, but he exploits tensions within the concept
to subvert its prominence as a cultural conception of beauty. Here in the context of
astronomy, however, that pattern of admiration serves his philosophical purposes. By
comparing astronomical motions to none other than Daedalus’ plans for self-moving
statues (Resp. 529e1), Socrates can appropriate a trope in archaic poetry of admiring
the starry sky and prevailing associations of poikilia to beauty and divine expertise.52
Just as Daedalus’ plans show the beautiful work of an intelligent craftsperson, the
beauty and precision of the visible cosmos reveal it to be the most beautiful working-up
of sensible material by the demiurge (530a6–7) and make it a useful model in the proper
study of astronomy (529d8–9). To admire poikilia in this way is to restructure
51 We are surely to recall the opening of the dialogue: Socrates went down to the Piraeus to observe
the inaugural festival of Bendis and found the processions beautiful (Resp. 327a3–4). A.W.
Nightingale, Spectacles of Truth in Classical Greek Philosophy: Theoria in its Cultural Context
(Cambridge, 2004) analyses this appropriation of the practice of theōria.
52 See Grand-Clément (n. 2 [2011]), 548–52 for this archaic trope, echoed also at Phd. 110b5–d7.
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admiration toward the non-sensible nature of beauty. The point of displacing the aesthet-
ics of poikilia is ultimately to put admiration of the beauty of poikilia in its proper place.
Why not conclude, perhaps more simply, that Plato distinguishes a beneficial from a
harmful species of poikilia?53 This strategy, though elegant, suppresses the essentially
problematical character of the concept. Not only may only a rare philosophic few benefit
from admiring astronomical motions but this benefit cannot eliminate—and Plato’s
re-conception of beauty merely mitigates—the risk of becoming more deeply absorbed
in sensible beauty and its pleasures. This is a consequence of the fact that cosmic
poikilia is intelligently arranged yet sensory, sitting precisely at the juncture of a deep
ambivalence in Plato concerning the role and limits of vision in the philosophic life.
Put generally, vision is a metonym for the foolishness of the senses but a metaphor
for knowledge, and the vision of beauty often a necessary means to advance from the
former toward the latter.54 The role of poikilia sharply focusses this broader ambiva-
lence, ramifying on a cosmic scale the psychological ambivalence of Socrates toward
the fascinating experience of mimetic poetry. Just as with the complexity of his phenom-
enology, so too we cannot in general distinguish beneficial from harmful species of
poikilia or modes and objects of fascination. This distinction is either unavailable
from within such an absorbing experience or inadequate to its combination of admir-
ation and fear. We must hold both sides together to appreciate how ethical and epistemic
progress for Plato must confront a problem of responding properly to fascinating yet
dangerous attractions.
This conclusion contains an insight into the ethical psychology of beauty. Plato’s
treatment of the aesthetics of poikilia depends on the recognition that cultural concep-
tions of beauty shape in fundamental and non-rational ways the kind of life one admires
and aspires to live. Balanced against the promise of beauty to manifest what a good life
consists in and to move one to live accordingly is an acute worry that its experience can
mislead: the pursuit of beauty is rife with anxiety and risk. Both sides of this coin reflect
how beauty for Plato names both a cultural and philosophical problem and a potential
solution: its wondrous—one might say fascinated—experience has the unique ability to
disrupt how one ordinarily lives and to intimate more nourishing ways of living. But if
one cannot tell this experience apart from the experience of poikilia, the dangers of
the latter infiltrate the former; and if one must pursue beauty to live well, these dangers
cannot be escaped and must be negotiated as one learns what it means to live well.
A sense of beauty guides how we live. We follow its lead at great peril.
JONATHAN FINEUniversity of Hawai‘i at Mānoa
53 As does the singularly sensitive treatment of Tulli (n. 3), e.g. at 235: ‘Platone practica la Spaltung
di matrice arcaica, divide. La poikilia negativa della produzione poetica non è certo la poikilia
positiva.’
54 See N. Pappas, The Philosopher’s New Clothes: The Theaetetus, the Academy, and Philosophy’s
Turn Against Fashion (New York, 2017), from whom I borrow the contrast of metonym and meta-
phor; and particularly in this connection, F. Gonzalez, ‘The power and ambivalence of a beautiful
image in Plato and the poets’, in P. Destrée and R.G. Edmonds III (edd.), Plato and the Power of
Images (Boston, 2017), 47–65.
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